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Retirement benefit guarantees can ensure a minimum standard of living in retirement. I propose a framework
to discuss the design of such guarantees. The model features a standard life-cycle setting, in which
individual agents’ choices can have negative external effects on public finances, whenever their retirement
consumption drops below a minimum level. Within this framework, I derive two alternative forms
of intervention that can efficiently deliver a minimum standard of living to retirees. According to the
first policy, agents use part of their accumulated assets to purchase a claim providing a fixed income
stream for the duration of their life. According to the second policy, they purchase an appropriately
structured portfolio insurance policy.
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Mostly motivated by the aging of the population, several countries around the world have
adopted new approaches in the ways their citizens prepare for retirement. Countries with
substantially diﬀerent economic structures and histories like Australia, Chile, Mexico and
Sweden have partially replaced unfunded “pay as you go” retirement systems with funded
retirement systems featuring private accounts.1 Even in many countries where such changes
have not occurred (such as the US), there has been intense political debate on proposals to
introduce individual accounts into the social security system. Simultaneously, in the private
sector, deﬁned contribution plans have increased in popularity and importance as opposed
to deﬁned beneﬁt plans.
A common concern, acknowledged even by proponents of these trends, is that such
changes imply an increased importance of ﬁnancial markets, exposing retirement income
to market risk. For instance, a downturn in the stock market could create pressures to
provide direct or indirect transfers to the aﬀected retirees, increasing distortionary taxes. 2
Because of these concerns, it is common for countries to complement the shift towards
private accounts and deﬁned contribution plans with various measures to ensure a mini-
mum standard of living in retirement. Such measures include minimum return guarantees,
minimum retirement incomes, phased (as opposed to lump sum) withdrawals upon entering
retirement, and mandates to use part of the accumulated balances to purchase a ﬁxed annu-
ity and ensure a minimum deﬁned beneﬁt. For instance, a recent Government Accountability
Oﬃce report3 investigates such regulations in the UK, Switzerland and the Netherlands and
documents that these countries use some combination of the above measures. The idea to
use incentives or mandates, so that part of the accumulated balances in deﬁned contribution
plans be taken in the form of a deﬁned-beneﬁt annuity, is also the topic of a current policy
1Mitchell and Lachance (2003) report that more than 20 countries have established individual accounts.
2For instance Shoﬀner et al. (2005) note in a Social Security Report that a common fear about individuals
that have ran out of assets is that “ ...Such individuals might then qualify for, and as a result place a greater
burden on, means-tested antipoverty programs.”
3Bovbjerg (2009)
1discussion in the US.4
The pervasive use of measures to ensure a minimum standard of living in retirement
has led to various studies that evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of speciﬁc (and sometimes
ad-hoc) policy interventions adopted in certain countries.5 Less emphasis has been placed
on developing a uniﬁed theoretical framework to discuss, compare and design policies that
would ensure a minimum standard of living in a fully funded retirement system. The present
paper takes a ﬁrst step in that direction by using methods developed in the last two decades
in ﬁnancial economics.
The proposed framework is in the tradition started by Ramsey (1927). A benevolent,
rational central planner aims to maximize social welfare. Agents in the society maximize
their individual welfare, which does not coincide with social welfare. The reason for the
discrepancy is that an agent’s consumption in retirement can have negative, external eﬀects.
This occurs when retirement consumption drops below a given minimum level and triggers
“bailout” transfers ﬁnanced by distortionary taxes.6 To avoid such negative external eﬀects,
the central planner adopts policies to ensure that a retiree’s consumption does not fall below
the speciﬁed minimum level.
The allowed interventions are transfers from and to the agent. They can be chosen
subject to two constraints:
The ﬁrst constraint is informational. The central planner does not observe the agent’s
assets or consumption, just the returns in ﬁnancial markets. This informational constraint
leads to a “hidden action” problem, analogous to the problems considered in the voluminous
literature on moral hazard. The fact that the central planner cannot observe (and hence
4See e.g. “The Obama administration is weighing how the government can encourage workers to turn
their savings into guaranteed income streams following a collapse in retiree accounts when the stock market
plunged.” by Theo Francis in http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20603037&sid=aHFCE999fWR0
.
5For some examples see e.g. Feldstein (2005b), Feldstein (2005a), Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001), Fuster
et al. (2008), Mitchell and Lachance (2003), Constantinides et al. (2002), and the numerous contributions in
the special NBER volume edited by Campbell and Feldstein (2001).
6Inside the model, such negative and external eﬀects arise, when agents ﬁnd it optimal to falsely claim
that they experienced adverse idiosyncratic shocks, as a result overburdening the welfare system, which is
ﬁnanced by distortionary taxes on workers.
2cannot dictate) the agent’s consumption, savings, and portfolio choices implies that inter-
ventions need to induce the agent to choose consumption levels that are consistent with the
goal of a minimum standard of living.
The second constraint is a full-ﬁnancing constraint. The net present value of the transfers
provided to the agent should be equal to the present value of the taxes raised by the agent.
This makes the analysis applicable to private accounts and pensions. The broader issue of
the advantages and disadvantages of full funding - as opposed to “pay as you go” - is outside
the scope of this paper, and the reader is referred to the large literature that discusses
this issue.7 A practical implication of the full-ﬁnancing constraint is that all of the policies
considered in the paper can be implemented by having agents purchase appropriate ﬁnancial
products provided by the private sector.
Besides their intuitive and practical appeal, the above two constraints also help to make
the theoretical results of the paper most surprising for the following reason: Fundamental
results in ﬁnance and macroeconomics imply that in the absence of frictions, only the net
present value of an agent’s resources guides her consumption choices. Hence, if agents can
choose their consumption freely, and the transfers received by the agent are ﬁnanced by
herself, then no intervention can succeed in aﬀecting the agent’s consumption choices. The
agent will simply “undo” the eﬀects of the transfers by altering her portfolio and her savings
plans. In the literature this insight is known as “Ricardian Equivalence”.8
To overcome this hurdle, I assume a friction, which leads to the failure of Ricardian
Equivalence. Speciﬁcally, I assume that agents cannot borrow against future transfers. (Such
constraints can be easily enforced in courts by forbidding securitization of such payments).
Because of the resulting borrowing constraint, the central planner can aﬀect the agent’s
consumption choices and the optimization problem becomes non-trivial.
Within the context of the baseline model, I show that there can be (at least) two in-
7For some exemplary recent contributions, see e.g., Krueger and Kubler (2006) and Ball and Mankiw
(2007) for two alternative views on the issue.
8Barro (1974) and Abel (1987) contain a modern treatment of this idea that is originally due to D.
Ricardo. Similar results are obtained in Bodie et al. (1992), who show that an agent’s consumption is
proportional to an agent’s total wealth, which includes the net present value of all sorts of income etc..
3terventions that maximize the postulated social welfare function. One such intervention is
to require new retirees to use part of their accumulated assets upon entering retirement to
purchase a ﬁxed income stream for the duration of their life, while leaving the rest of the
assets at their disposal. The level of that ﬁxed income stream is explicitly derived and shown
to be a multiple of the minimum level of consumption that the central planner is aiming
to enforce. An alternative intervention takes the form of “portfolio insurance”. The central
planner (or some insurance company) sets certain incentive compatible “guidelines” as to
how the consumer is expected to consume, save and allocate her assets. Based on these
guidelines, the central planner infers the agent’s asset evolution, and makes transfers once
the value of the agent’s portfolio threatens to become zero.
A surprising feature of the analysis is that these two policies imply the same welfare for
the agent, but in general the initial payment required to ﬁnance the ﬁrst policy is larger than
the respective payment for the second policy. I show that this result is driven by the fact
that the insights of Ricardian equivalence continue to apply in states of the world where the
borrowing constraint is not binding. From a practical perspective, this implies that pricing
retirement beneﬁt guarantees as contingent claims (as is routinely done in the literature) may
be informative for determining premiums, but may be misleading for welfare comparisons.
Methodologically the paper relates to the ﬁnance literature on optimal portfolio choice
in the presence of constraints, and in particular to the literature that uses convex duality /
dynamic Lagrange multiplier methods to solve such problems.9 The typical approach in this
literature is to take the income process of the agent as given (see e.g. He and Pages (1993))
and derive the Lagrange multipliers associated with the borrowing constraint. The new
methodological aspect of the present paper is that the convex duality approach is applied
in a “backwards” fashion. The central planner ﬁrst solves for the best possible Lagrange
multiplier process that is associated with the borrowing constraint, and then searches for a
transfer process that is associated with these Lagrange multipliers. This new methodology
9The monograph by Karatzas and Shreve (1998) contains a thorough treatment of such methods. A
sample of general-equilibrium ﬁnance applications of this approach include Cuoco (1997), Basak and Cuoco
(1998), and Gallmeyer and Holliﬁeld (2008) amongst many others.
4could prove useful in a variety of “hidden-action” setups, where the principal designs com-
pensation schemes that exploit constraints faced by the agent. Finally, the paper relates to
a literature in dynamic public ﬁnance10. That literature considers optimal insurance and
contract design problems predominantly in setups of “hidden information” and idiosyncratic
shocks. The present paper diﬀers from that literature in that it deals with a “hidden action”
problem in the presence of aggregate shocks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 introduces
a central planner with the task of keeping the agent’s consumption above a minimum level
by usage of appropriate taxes and transfers. Section 4 considers the agent’s reaction to
the presence of such intervention. Section 5 derives an upper bound to welfare no matter
which set of admissible taxes/transfers is utilized. Section 6 illustrates two distinct ways
of attaining that upper bound. Section 7 discusses pre-retirement implications. Section
8 provides a justiﬁcation for the assumed negative externality that arises when an agent’s
consumption drops below the minimum level. Section 9 discusses the implications of closing
the model in general equilibrium. Section 10 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Agents, preferences, and endowments
The baseline model is very similar to the small open economy version of Blanchard (1985) and
the life-cycle model of Farhi and Panageas (2007). Accordingly, the investment opportunity
set (interest rate, equity premium etc.) is taken as given. Section 9 shows that the main
conclusions of this baseline model remain valid in a closed, general-equilibrium economy.
All agents are identical. The typical agent faces a probability of death q per unit of time
dt, and newly born agents also arrive at the same rate. All agents have constant relative risk
aversion γ, and a constant discount rate ρ. To expedite the exposition and shorten proofs, I
10See e.g. Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) amongst many others.
5concentrate on the empirically relevant case γ > 1.11
Life has two phases. A “work” phase and a “retirement phase”. During the work phase
agents enjoy a constant level of leisure l < 1 and obtain an income stream equal to Y. Once
they retire, leisure irreversibly jumps to l = 1 and they receive no more labor income.
Agents’ instantaneous utility is given by the standard speciﬁcation used in the macroe-





1−γ . To ensure that ul > 0, I assume that α < 0.
















I allow τ to be either a ﬁxed time or optimally chosen by the agent, as part of her opti-
mization problem. Section 7 discusses the implications of these two alternative assumptions.
2.2 Investment opportunity set
Agents can invest in the money market, where they receive a constant strictly positive interest




= µdt + σdBt,
where µ > r and σ > 0 are given constants and Bt is a one-dimensional Brownian motion
on a complete probability space (Ω,F,P).13 The realization of this Brownian motion is the
only source of uncertainty in this economy. The extension to multiple assets is straightfor-
ward and is left out.
As is well understood, dynamic trading in the stock and the bond leads to a dynamically
11With a few additional technical assumptions the results can be extended to γ < 1 at the cost of lengthier
proofs.
12This speciﬁcation is identical to the utility speciﬁcation used in Farhi and Panageas (2007) up to a
re-deﬁnition of the parameters. The reason for the popularity of this speciﬁcation in macroeconomics is that
it leads to a stationary choice of hours in general equilibrium models, consistent with the data.
13F = {Ft} denotes the P-augmentation of the ﬁltration generated by Bt.
6complete market. (See e.g. Duﬃe (2001) or Karatzas and Shreve (1998)). As Karatzas and
Shreve (1998) show, the assumptions of a constant interest rate and risk premium imply the
existence of a unique stochastic discount factor Ht, so that the time-t price of any claim























The agent can also enter into “annuity-style” contracts with a competitive life insurance
company as in Blanchard (1985). Speciﬁcally, these contracts specify the following cash-
ﬂows: The insurance company oﬀers an income stream of p per unit of time dt, in exchange
for receiving one dollar if the agent dies over the next interval dt. Competition between
insurance companies implies that p = q.
2.3 Portfolio and wealth processes
Throughout life, an agent chooses a portfolio process πt and a consumption process ct. The
portfolio process πt is the dollar amount invested in the risky asset (the “stock market”) at
time t. The rest, Wt − πt, is invested in the money market. Since the key insights do not
depend on the presence of bequest motives, I simplify matters and assume that the agent has
no bequest motives. As a result, the agent has an incentive to enter Blanchard-style annuity
contracts for the full amount of her ﬁnancial wealth. This results in an income stream of qWt
per unit of time dt while she is alive. In exchange, the entire remaining wealth of the agent
gets transferred to the insurance company when the agent dies. Accordingly, the wealth
14From a macroeconomic perspective, one can also think of Ht as the marginal utility of consumption of
the world-representative agent.
7process of a retired agent evolves as
dWt = qWtdt + πt {µdt + σdBt} + {Wt − πt}rdt − ctdt, (3)
and the wealth process of a working agent is given by:
dWt = qWtdt + πt {µdt + σdBt} + {Wt − πt}rdt + Y dt − ctdt.
An additional requirement is that wealth must remain non-negative throughout:
Wt ≥ 0 for all t. (4)
This constraint excludes un-collateralized borrowing.
2.4 Externalities when consumption falls below a minimum stan-
dard of living
As already mentioned in the introductory section, societies typically opt to introduce regula-
tory measures to ensure that retirees’ consumption does not fall below a minimum standard.
To capture the reasons for such interventions in a simple way and expedite the presen-
tation of the main results, it is easiest to start by assuming that every time an individual’s
consumption falls below a level ξ in retirement, this drop has a negative externality on the
rest of society. The source of this externality is revisited in section 8, which shows how this
externality can arise endogenously in a society that provides transfers to individuals with
insuﬃcient assets through distortionary taxation on other individuals.
Section 8 also shows that in the presence of such external eﬀects, there is a wedge between
an individual’s and the central planner’s objectives, since the central planner wants to ensure
that agents choose consumption plans that satisfy
ct ≥ ξ for all t > tb + τ (5)
8From now and until section 8, I simply assume that the central planner aims to impose
constraint (5) on the agents. Based on this assumption, I derive the implications of this
constraint for the provision of retirement beneﬁts.
3 Introducing a role for the central planner
To achieve the goal of imposing constraint (5) on the agent’s choices, the central planner can
use transfers to modify the agent’s behavior so that her consumption plans satisfy equation
(5).
To make matters realistic, the central planner’s information set is limited. The central
planner can observe an agent’s income and the realized returns on the stock market, but not
the agent’s assets or her consumption.
Based on that information set, the central planner needs to structure transfers to the
individual so as to ensure that constraint (5) holds. To keep with the assumption that the
retirement system is fully funded, such transfers are ﬁnanced by the agent upon entering
retirement.
To obtain these optimal transfers it is most useful to use backward induction and split the
problem into a “post- retirement” part (which is is solved ﬁrst) and a “pre-retirement” part,
which is solved subsequently. In the post-retirement part the central planner determines
the optimal transfer process that maximizes the agent’s retirement utility subject to (5),
and the appropriate incentive compatibility constraints, assuming that these transfers are
ﬁnanced with a lump sum tax upon entering retirement. This is done in sections 3.1 - 6.
The pre-retirement part is discussed in section 7.
3.1 The post-retirement problem
It is now possible to provide a mathematical formulation to the central planner’s post-
retirement problem. Because of the time-invariance of the problem, I henceforth simplify
notation and normalize the time of retirement tb + τ to be equal to zero. I also normalize
9the value of the stochastic discount factor at retirement to be equal to H0 = 1.15
Problem 1 The central planner’s objective is to determine an admissible cumulative non-



















and subject to the constraint that ct solves the agent’s optimization problem given Gt












dWt = qWtdt + πt {µdt + σdBt} + {Wt − πt}rdt − ctdt + dGt (10)
W0+ = W0 − D0 (11)
Wt ≥ 0 for all t > 0 (12)
Equation (6) states that the central planner aims to maximize the agent’s welfare, subject
to the additional requirement that the agent’s consumption not fall below the minimum level
ξ that would trigger the assumed negative externalities on the rest of society.
Equations (8) and (11) state that the cost of providing the transfer process Gt to the
consumer should be self-ﬁnanced by a tax D0. Parenthetically, this “self-ﬁnancing” require-
ment implies that the central planner can simply specify the process Gt that each consumer
should purchase and leave it to competitive ﬁnancial companies to price and provide these
15This latter normalization is without loss of generality since all quantities of interest depend on the ratio
of the stochastic discount factor between two points in time, rather than its level.
10transfers.
Finally, equations (9)-(12) capture the incentive compatibility requirement. Equation
(9) states that the optimal process ct cannot be mandated by the central planner (since the
central planner observes neither the consumption nor the assets of the agent). Instead, the
optimal consumption process is chosen optimally by the consumer, who is faced with the
budget dynamics of equation (10). These dynamics are identical to the ones in equation (3),
except for the presence of the transfers dGt, and the fact that the consumer needs to ﬁnance
these transfers by paying the amount D0 upon entering retirement. Accordingly, an instant
after entering retirement, her wealth W0+ is equal to the funds she has accumulated in the
pre-retirement phase (W0) net of the lump sum payment D0.
The ﬁnal requirement that constrains a consumer’s choices is the borrowing constraint
(12). This constraint plays a central role in the analysis. Without this constraint, it would be
impossible for the central planner to ﬁnd a set of taxes and transfers that would induce the
agent to choose a consumption path that satisﬁes (7). The reason is due to a well understood
result in Public Finance, known as Ricardian Equivalence: Since the market is dynamically
complete in the absence of the constraint (12), a consumer’s feasible consumption plans are
only constrained by the consumer’s intertemporal budget constraint, i.e. the requirement
that the net present value of her consumption be equal to the wealth she has accumulated.
Since the net present value of transfers is equal to the lump sum tax D0, the consumer’s
intertemporal budget constraint is unaﬀected by the intervention, no matter what process Gt
the central planner chooses. Accordingly, the tax-ﬁnanced transfers cannot aﬀect the con-
sumer’s plans. Agents can continue to consume as they would in the absence of intervention
and only modify their portfolios so as to undo the eﬀects of the transfers.
The presence of a borrowing constraint such as (12), however, makes taxes and transfers
non-neutral. The reason is that a borrowing constraint implies stronger restrictions than a
simple intertemporal budget constraint on the agent’s feasible consumption choices. Hence,
by a judicious choice of an initial tax and subsequent transfers, the central planner can
aﬀect the agent’s consumption. Parenthetically, the borrowing constraint (12) is realistic
11and easy to implement in practice. It suﬃces that the central planner instruct courts not to
enforce agreements that would let lenders seize future transfers as collateral for loans.
Because of the central role played by the borrowing constraint (12), the next section
reviews some known results related to the implications of the constraint (12) for optimal
consumption processes. Subsequent sections use these results to solve problem 1.
4 The agent’s consumption choices in the presence of
transfers and borrowing constraints
Suppose that at the time of retirement (time 0) the central planner collects an amount D0
and then promises an admissible cumulative transfer process Gt. It is natural to ask how
the agent’s consumption choices will be aﬀected by this intervention in the presence of the
constraint (12).
To gain some intuition, it is useful to start by assuming that there is no uncertainty
(σ = 0), so that µ = r, the agent’s dynamic budget constraint is given by dWt = (q + r)Wtdt
−ctdt +dGt, and the stochastic discount factor is deterministic (Ht = e−rt). The deterministic








−qsHsdGs for all t ≥ 0. (13)
Applying the Lagrangian method, an agent’s problem can be converted into an uncon-































16To derive this equation, note that in the deterministic case d(e−qtHtWt) = e−qtHt (dGt − ctdt). Inte-
grating the left and right hand side of this equation and imposing the requirement Wt ≥ 0 leads to (13).
12Applying integration by parts to the second line of (14) and imposing the transversality


















−qsHsXsdGs + λ[W0 − D0], (15)
where






Maximizing L over ct amounts to simply maximizing the expression inside round brackets







If all ζs = 0 (i.e. when the borrowing constraint Wt ≥ 0 is not binding) then Xt = 1, and






be proportional to the stochastic discount factor Ht.
However, when the borrowing constraint is binding, then consumption is aﬀected by the
presence of the decreasing process Xt, which reﬂects the cumulative eﬀect of the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the borrowing constraint. By construction Xt is a process that
is non-increasing and starts at X0 = 1.
To fully determine the solution to the consumer’s problem, one needs to determine the
Lagrange multipliers λ,ζs. He and Pages (1993) show that this amounts to ﬁrst maximizing
L over ct (given arbitrary λ,Xt) and then minimizing the resulting expression over λ,Xt.
Speciﬁcally, He and Pages (1993) show the following Proposition, which holds also in the
presence of uncertainty:17
Proposition 1 Let D be the set of non-increasing, non-negative and progressively measur-
able processes that start at X(0) = 1. Then, the value function V (W0) of an agent can be
17Marcet and Marimon (1998) show a similar result in the context of recursive contracts.
13expressed as:
























t ,λ∗ denote the process Xt and the constant λ that minimize the above expression.
Then the optimal consumption process c∗
t for a consumer faced with the borrowing constraint
(12) is given by (16) evaluated at λ = λ∗,Xt = X∗
t . Moreover, the process X∗
t decreases only





t = 0 (18)
Finally, the resulting wealth process for any t > 0 satisﬁes:
Wt =
Et
















5 Government transfers and their welfare eﬀects: an
upper bound
Proposition 1 gives an intuitive way to summarize the eﬀects of the incentive compatibility
requirement (equations [9]-[12]).
It asserts that every transfer process Gt will be associated with a constant λ∗ (Gt) and a
Lagrange multiplier process X∗
t (Gt). Given this correspondence between a choice of Gt and
the resulting pair (λ∗,X∗
t ), there is a straightforward way to obtain an upper bound to the
value function of problem 1. In particular consider the following problem:
Problem 2 Maximize:










14All admissible  ,   t X  











Figure 1: An illustration of Lemma 1. The admissible choices of problem 1 map into a subset
of the admissible choices of problem 2.
subject to:
E0













Problem 2 is the problem of a central planner that can choose directly the consumption
of the agent, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (21), the constraint on the
minimum consumption level (equation [22]), and the additional requirement that any chosen
consumption process should have a representation in the form of equation (23) for some Xt.
In eﬀect, problem 2 allows the central planner to choose directly the Lagrange multipliers
(λ,Xt) without being concerned whether there exists any pair of taxes and transfers (D0,Gt)
that would render these Lagrange multipliers as shadow values of the consumer’s optimization
problem (9).
Figure 1 gives an intuitive argument to show that the optimized value J to Problem 2
provides an upper bound to the value function Ω of problem 1. Indeed, any admissible
15consumption process of problem 1 needs to satisfy18 equations (21) and (22). Moreover,
Proposition 1 asserts that there always exists some pair of λ,Xt such that any admissible
consumption process of problem 1 can be expressed in the form of equation (23). Therefore,
any Gt,D0 maps into a subset of pairs (Xt,λ) allowed by Problem 2, and the value function
of problem 2 must therefore provide an upper bound to problem 1. The following Lemma
provides a formal proof.
Lemma 1 Let G be the class of all transfer processes Gt that enforce (7) and satisfy (8).
Furthermore, let V (W0) be given as in equation (17). Then the value functions of problems
1 and 2 satisfy :
V (W0) ≤ J (W0) (24)
The remainder of this section derives an explicit solution to problem 2, while the next
section shows that there exist transfer processes G∗
t that are optimal, because they make
equation (24) hold with equality.
As a ﬁrst step towards solving problem 2 it is useful to ask whether constraints (21), (22),
and (23) will bind at an optimum. The top panel of ﬁgure 1 gives an optimal consumption
path for a random realization of Ht assuming that one maximizes (20) subject only to the




corresponds to what the consumer would choose, if left alone. Because Ht is log-normal, so is
ct and accordingly ct < ξ with positive probability. Imposing the constraint ct ≥ ξ (but not









t is what the central planner would choose, if she could directly observe and
mandate the agent’s consumption and portfolio choices.
18The consumer’s dynamic budget constraint (10) implies the intertemporal budget constraint
W0 − D0 +
  ∞
0
e−qtHt(dGt − ctdt) ≥ 0.

























Figure 2: Implications of the constraints in problem 2
However, the central planner cannot directly observe these choices. Instead, she needs
to induce the agent to choose consumption paths that satisfy ct ≥ ξ, by exploiting binding
borrowing constraints. This is captured by equation (23). The bottom panel of Figure 2
shows that this incentive compatibility requirement is in general binding. Indeed, equation










t should be a non-decreasing process (since Xt is non-increasing).
Clearly, the ratio c∗∗
t /c∗∗∗
t has decreasing sections and therefore c∗∗
t cannot satisfy (23). There-
fore, J (W0) (and accordingly the value function Ω in problem 1) will in general be lower
than what the central planner could attain if it observed and mandated consumption.
The next proposition determines the solution of problem 2:
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γ + φ − 1
φ − 1
Kξ. (27)
Additionally, for any λ > 0, let the process X∗
t be given by
X
∗







Then the value function of problem (2) is given by










































Letting λ∗ be the scalar that minimizes (30), the optimal triplet that solves problem (2) is
given by λ∗, X∗














φ − (ρ + q) = 0
Evaluating the left hand side of this equation at φ = 1 gives:
−(r + q) < 0
Hence the larger of the two roots of the quadratic equation is larger than 1.
18Proposition 2 provides the optimal solution and the value function of problem 2, assuming
that the agent enters retirement with a level of assets that are no smaller than the lower
bound of equation (27). Assumption (27) will be maintained henceforth and discussed in
further detail in section 7.
6 Optimal Transfer Processes
This section illustrates two distinct processes G∗
t that attain the upper bound V (W0;G∗
t) =
J (W0).
6.1 A constant income stream
The simplest form of transfer process is a constant income stream: The central planner
collects a lump sum tax of D0 =
y0
r+q and in exchange she delivers a constant stream of y0
until the agent dies. Surprisingly, this policy is a solution to problem 1, as long as y0 is
chosen judiciously. The following proposition gives a closed form solution for y0.
Proposition 3 Let y0 be given by
y0 ≡ (r + q)Kξ
 
1




where K is given in (26) and φ is given in (25). The policy of collecting D0 =
y0
r+q and
providing transfers equal to y0 until the agent dies, attains the upper bound V (W0;Gt = y0) =
J (W0) and is therefore a solution to problem 1.
An interesting feature of the optimal policy in proposition 3 is contained in the following
Lemma




19Lemma 2 shows that if the central planner wants to ensure a minimum consumption
of one dollar, she needs to deliver more than one dollar in guaranteed income. This result
is driven by the fact that agents cannot be excluded from markets, and the presence of a
constant income guarantee incentivizes them to use some of the constant income to take
risks in the stock market. Therefore the central planner needs to set y0 > ξ to ensure that
ct ≥ ξ.
6.2 Portfolio Insurance
Providing agents with a constant income is not the unique way to attain the upper bound
in Proposition 2. The approach presented in this section also succeeds in attaining the same
upper bound. To describe this approach, let λ∗ be the scalar that minimizes (30). Then














t (λ∗) is the process deﬁned in (28).
This section shows the following two results:
a) The process (32) attains the upper bound of Proposition 2.
b) The process (32) has an intuitive economic interpretation as a type of minimum return
guarantee (portfolio insurance) on the agent’s optimal portfolio of stocks and bonds.
The following proposition formalizes the ﬁrst claim and provides results that are useful
towards establishing the second claim.
Proposition 4 Let λ∗ be the scalar that minimizes (30) and X∗
t (λ∗) be the process that is
given in (28). Consider an agent who anticipates transfers given by (32) and is faced with
an initial tax of D0, where D0 satisﬁes (8). Then











































c) The initial tax D0 associated with (32) is given by
D0 = Kξ
1







The portfolio policy (34) will aid in the interpretation of (32) as a form of portfolio
insurance. To obtain some intuition on the nature of (32), consider ﬁrst the following puzzling
feature of the optimal portfolio policy: As ct → ξ, equation (35) implies that Zt → ξ−γ and












Because the agent’s ﬁnancial wealth approaches zero as Zt → ξ−γ, but her stock position
doesn’t, a further negative return on the stock market would lead to a negative ﬁnancial
asset position in the absence of any transfers. This means that the transfers given by (32)
21act as a minimum return guarantee, which ensures that the agent receives just enough funds
to sustain her ﬁnancial wealth at zero and keep her consumption at ξ.
It is useful here to clarify that these transfers do not require that the central planner
actually observe the path of the agent’s assets or her consumption. By the deﬁnition of
X∗
t in equation (28), the central planner only needs to know the evolution of the stochastic
discount factor Ht, which can be inferred from the path of the stock market21 and the assets
of the agent at the time of retirement,22 which can be inferred from the consumer’s optimal
retirement decision as section 7 shows. A simple way of thinking about the transfer process
Gt in (32) is that the central planner and the agent have a joint understanding of how the
consumer will consume and invest in the presence of the transfers given by (32). Based on
its (correct) understanding of the consumer’s optimal policies, the central planner can infer
the agent’s wealth and make just enough transfers when needed, so as to keep the agent’s
wealth above 0 and her optimal consumption above ξ.
6.3 Comparing the two policies
Given that both policies attain the upper bound of equation (30), this means that they imply
the same value function for the agent, and hence are equivalent from a welfare perspective23.
However, the two policies do diﬀer. They make transfers of diﬀerent magnitudes in
diﬀerent states of the world. The initial payments that they imply are also diﬀerent. Indeed,













21Note that log(Ht) − log(H0) = −(r + 0.5κ2)t − κ(Bt − B0) = −(r + 0.5κ2)t − κ
σσ(Bt − B0) = −
−(r + 0.5κ2)t − κ
σ
 
logPt − logP0 −
 









µ − 0.5σ2 
− (r + 0.5κ2)
 
t.
22The level of assets at retirement determine λ∗ by equation (30).
23The derivations in the appendix also show that they imply exactly the same consumption process “path
by path”.













Since c0 ≥ ξ and24 c
−γ






Hence the “portfolio insurance” policy implies an initial payment that cannot be larger than
the initial payment of the “constant income” policy. This is intuitive, since the constant
income policy delivers the same transfers in all states of the world, including states of the
world where the borrowing constraint doesn’t bind. By contrast, the “portfolio insurance”
policy delivers payments only when the borrowing constraint binds.
However, when c0 = ξ (or alternatively W0+ = 0) the two policies imply the same initial
payment. Hence the initial payment of the two policies diﬀers only when the borrowing
constraint is not binding, but is identical when the borrowing constraint does bind. This
is the reason why the two policies imply diﬀerent initial payments, but are identical from a
welfare perspective. The additional resources delivered by the constant income policy are
delivered in states of the world where the borrowing constraint is not binding and hence can
be “undone” by agents’ portfolio choice, consistent with the Ricardian Equivalence theorem.
The above discussion illustrates that simply comparing the costs of retirement beneﬁt
guarantees does not provide suﬃcient information for welfare comparisons.25
24Recall that H0 = X∗
0 = 1.
25As a ﬁnal remark, a source of diﬀerence between the two policies is informational. The constant income
policy does not require exact knowledge of the level of an agent’s assets at retirement, whereas the portfolio
insurance policy does. However, even if assets were unobservable at retirement, an agent who could hide,
but not over-report her assets, would have an incentive to report her assets truthfully. The reason is that
D
p.i.
0 is decreasing26 in W0. Since a larger D
p.i.
0 “tightens” the agent’s borrowing constraints at retirement,
an agent has an incentive to report as large a value of W0 as she can. Assuming that the agent can hide,
but not over-report her assets, she would voluntarily report the actual value of W0.
237 Minimum level of assets and implications for pre-
retirement savings
A maintained assumption of the analysis sofar was that the agent’s assets upon entering
retirement were above the minimum level of equation (27). As the next Proposition shows,
this assumption is not only suﬃcient, but it is also necessary for the existence of transfer
processes that can induce a consumption process that satisﬁes ct ≥ ξ.
Proposition 5 An admissible transfer process Gt that can induce ct ≥ ξ exists if and only
if W0 ≥ W min.
Proposition 5 has implications for the agent’s pre-retirement problem. Speciﬁcally, the
feasibility of enforcing the constraint ct ≥ ξ post-retirement is equivalent to requiring that
the agent arrives in retirement with assets that are at least as large as implied by condition
(27).
If the central planner can enforce lump-sum taxation in retirement (say through direct
punishments),27 the results in Farhi and Panageas (2007) imply that an agent who can choose
her retirement time optimally will retire only once her assets reach some level W, which will
be at least as large as
1
γ +φ−1
φ−1 Kξ. Hence, no intervention is required pre-retirement.
However, in many cases it may be more realistic to assume that agents have no choice
as to their retirement age (say because productivity deteriorates), and the central planner
cannot enforce lump sum taxation. In that case, some measure to ensure a mandatory level
of pre-retirement savings is required. For instance, if the retirement date τ is a ﬁxed time,
and the central planner’s only pre-retirement instrument is levying a constant fraction of
income, the central planner would have to collect a fraction χ of the agent’s income and
place it in a riskless asset on the agent’s behalf. Because of the constraint (12) this would be
suﬃcient to ensure that the agent has enough assets at retirement to pay D0. The minimum
level of χ that will enforce condition (27) is given by requiring that the net present value of
27Mathematically, this would imply that Ω(W0) = −∞ whenever W0 is smaller than W min.
24labor tax payment
  tb+τ
tb e−(r+q)(t−tb)χY dt equals the net present value of minimum required












An intuitive argument also shows that it is not optimal to collect more than χ. Given
that the agent is faced with borrowing constraints prior to retirement, any intervention that
reduces income today and returns it in the form of a lump sum payment upon entering
retirement will reduce the agent’s ability to smooth consumption. The following proposition
states this formally:
Proposition 6 The optimal pre-retirement mandatory savings rate that will ensure (27) is
given by (41).
8 Alternative justiﬁcations for the constraint ct ≥ ξ
The underlying assumption behind problem 1 is that there is a diﬀerence between the central
planner’s objective and the individual agent’s objective. The diﬀerence stems from the
assumed negative external eﬀects that arise, when an agent’s consumption falls below the
level ξ. This section revisits the reasons behind the assumed wedge between the central
planner’s and the agent’s objectives.
8.1 The constraint ct ≥ ξ in the presence of a welfare system
One potential reason for ensuring that agents can self-ﬁnance a minimum standard of living
in retirement is to deter them from over-burdening the welfare system, which is ﬁnanced
through distortionary taxation.
To substantiate this claim, I enrich the model to give a reason for the presence of a welfare
system, along with a stylized model of such a system. Speciﬁcally, assume that the cohort
of agents that are born at time tb retire at some ﬁxed date tb + τ. Until then, agents are
25identical in every respect. Upon entering retirement, however, a small fraction θ of agents
experiences an unobservable and idiosyncratic shock that results in a negative income stream
of Y for the rest of their lives. (The remaining fraction of the agents remain identical to the
agents described in the paper sofar). The idiosyncratic shock is catastrophic, in the sense









Equation (42) states that even if an agent saved all her wages, the resulting present value
would still be smaller than the present value of the negative shock Y .
Because of these catastrophic idiosyncratic shocks, the central planner can raise the
welfare of the time tb−cohort of agents by creating a “welfare” system, which works as
follows. Any agent who enters retirement can request transfers (dNt ≥ 0) from the central
planner. Requesting such transfers requires time and eﬀort (ﬁling paperwork, staying in lines
etc.). Speciﬁcally, an agent incurs a utility reduction of ξ−γ units per unit of transfer that














Given the above assumptions, any agent (whether she has experienced an idiosyncratic
shock or not) can always guarantee herself a consumption process above ξ by requesting
welfare transfers. To see this, let V (Wt) denote an agent’s value function and suppose that
the agent considers some deviation from her optimal plan, whereby she requests a small
amount ε > 0 from the central planner. Since V (Wt) is the value function, such deviations
should not be optimal, so that V (Wt) ≥ V (Wt + ε) − ξ−γε or
V (Wt)−V (Wt+ε)
ε ≥ −ξ−γ. Since
this inequality must hold for any ε, letting ε → 0 gives VW ≤ ξ−γ. Additionally, an agent’s
optimal consumption decisions must satisfy the ﬁrst order condition c
−γ
t = VW. Therefore,
it must be the case that ct ≥ ξ. Alternatively put, an agent can always guarantee herself a
26level of consumption above ξ by using the welfare system.
A ﬁnal assumption is that the welfare system is ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation. Specif-
ically, the central planner collects a labor tax equal to ωY, during the work years of the
agents, so as to ﬁnance any welfare payments later on. However, taxation is distortionary,
i.e, even though agents pay ωY in taxes, only a fraction (1 − δ)ωY reaches the central plan-
ner. The constant δ captures the work-disincentives and the associated deadweight costs
resulting from distortionary labor taxes. (See e.g. Barro (1979) for a seminal treatment).














assuming that only the θ-fraction of agents who suﬀer the idiosyncratic shock ever request
transfers. Because distortionary taxation and the utility costs of requesting welfare transfers
are both deadweight costs, the ex-ante welfare of the time-tb cohort of agents is maximized
if transfers are only requested from agents who experience idiosyncratic shocks. Obviously,
since the idiosyncratic shock is private information, “separation” of the two types of agents
can only occur if the agents modeled in section 2 (i.e. the agents who do not experience
idiosyncratic shocks) ﬁnd it optimal to not use the welfare system. In that sense the con-
straint (5) is a standard incentive compatibility constraint, which ensures that only agents
who experience idiosyncratic shocks ﬁnd it optimal to access the welfare system, but not the
agents who don’t experience such shocks.28.
8.2 Behavioral justiﬁcations
Problem 1 is also consistent with a behavioral interpretation. Several authors in behavioral
economics model the inability of an agent to commit as a principal-agent problem. The
principal is taken as the “prudent”, time-zero “self”, who has a diﬀerent objective than the
28The above reasoning is valid for suﬃciently small θ. As θ → 0, the ex-ante social welfare of the time-
tb cohort coincides with the welfare of problem 1, as long as the value function of agents who experience
idiosyncratic shocks in retirement is ﬁnite. Because of the welfare system, agents who experience idiosyncratic
shocks can keep their consumption bounded from below, and hence their value function is ﬁnite
27subsequent “reckless selves” who are making decisions.29 For instance, if one were to inter-
pret ξ as inelastic retirement expenditures associated with aging (say medical costs), then
the “prudent” self would like to impose the constraint ct ≥ ξ on the choices made by the
subsequent “reckless” selves, who will simply ignore this constraint. In such a behavioral
interpretation of the problem, the central planner’s choice of post-retirement transfers maxi-
mizes the welfare of the prudent “self”, by exploiting borrowing constraints on the “reckless”
selves.
9 Arbitrary stochastic discount factors and multiple
assets and sources of uncertainty
The assumption of a small open economy facilitated the analysis by rendering the stochastic
discount factor exogenous to the model. Another simplifying assumption is that everything
is driven by a single shock. Neither of these assumptions is restrictive. Even if the stochastic
discount factor were endogenous and driven by multiple sources of uncertainty, most of the
results of the paper would survive.
Speciﬁcally, the fact that (29) provides an upper bound to problem 1 remains valid for
any continuous stochastic discount factor Ht. It is also straightforward to show that the
portfolio insurance policy would attain the upper bound of proposition 2 for any stochastic
discount factor. However, the result that seems to depend on the constant nature of the
investment opportunity set is the optimality of the constant income policy. Nevertheless,
since the upper bound (29) is attainable for any stochastic discount factor, one can use
equation (29) to evaluate the magnitude of potential welfare losses, and balance these losses
against the simplicity of a constant income policy.
In summary, the qualitative ﬁndings of the model would survive even in a closed, general
equilibrium economy.30 In that case, the prices of the guarantees and all the parametric
29For economic applications of the concept of “multiple selves”, see e.g. Amador et al. (2006).
30Of course in general equilibrium care should be taken to make sure that aggregate consumption stays
above the level ξ multiplied by the mass of retirees. In an endowment economy this could be done by
28formulas would be altered. However, the key results of the paper, namely the nature of
the upper bound of equation (29) and the the existence of a portfolio insurance policy that
attains the upper bound, would remain unchanged.
10 Conclusion
By exploiting borrowing restrictions of agents, this paper proposed a framework to design
transfer processes that can ensure a minimum standard of living in retirement.
Within the framework of the baseline life-cycle model, two policies were shown to be
maximizing the central planner’s objective: According to the ﬁrst policy, retirees use part
of their accumulated assets to purchase a ﬁxed annuity that pays oﬀ a constant income
stream. The second policy is an appropriate form of portfolio insurance that ensures retirees
against further negative returns, once their assets approach zero. Somewhat surprisingly,
even though the two alternative policies lead to the same welfare, the cost of these guaran-
tees is diﬀerent in general. This suggests caution in drawing welfare conclusions from the
literature that prices guarantees as contingent claims.
Several issues are unexplored by the present paper. A ﬁrst question concerns unobserved
preference heterogeneity. If agents have diﬀerent risk aversions, or discount factors, then
the central planner needs to oﬀer menus of contracts in the spirit of discriminatory pricing.
It appears straightforward to extend the analysis to allow for this possibility. An open
question is whether the need to enforce sorting into diﬀerent types of contracts would aﬀect
the qualitative features of the guarantees.
A second question concerns the implications of such guarantees for asset prices. Even
though the results of the paper go through for arbitrary stochastic discount factors, it is likely
that extensive coverage of retirees by these guarantees would aﬀect the stochastic discount
factor in general equilibrium. Studying these two questions is left for future research.
boundedness assumptions on the aggregate endowment. Alternatively one could introduce production and
relax the bounds on the fundamental shocks.
29A Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. Subject to minor modiﬁcations, the proof of this proposition is identical
to the ﬁrst theorem of He and Pages (1993) and the reader is referred to that paper for a proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of this lemma is contained in the proof of proposition 2
(Particularly Lemma 4).
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of this proposition is established in steps. The following
Lemma contains a useful ﬁrst result.
Lemma 3 Take any λ ∈ (0,ξ−γ] and any process Gt and deﬁne
  Xt ≡ arg min
Xs∈D
E0










































Proof of Lemma 3. Let Λt ≡ 1 − 1
  Xt
. Applying Ito’s Lemma to Λt, one obtains dΛt ≡ d   Xt
(   Xt)
2.














d   Xt = 0, (45)
where cs is given explicitly by (23). Plugging (23) into (45), and observing that Λt changes when

















Then, for any admissible Gt and   Xt given by (43)
λE0
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  Xse−qsHsdGs =
  t
0
  Xse−qsHsdGs + Et
  ∞
t
  Xse−qsHsdGs. (47)
According to the martingale representation theorem, there exists a square integrable   ψs such that
Mt = M0 +
  t
0
  ψsdBs. (48)








= dMt −   Xte−qtHtdGt
=   ψtdBt −   Xte−qtHtdGt.
Now, ﬁxing an arbitrary ε > 0, letting τε be the ﬁrst time t such that |Λt| ≥ 1
ε, applying













Λs   Xse−qsHsdGs + E0
  T∧τε
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the second term on the right hand


















































e−qsHsdGs → 0, (52)























Λs   Xse−qsHsdGs.













Λs   Xse−qsHsdGs. (53)
Using (53) and the deﬁnition of Λt gives
λE0






























e−qsHs   XsΛsdGs
 
= 0.
Returning now to (46) and using the above equation yields
λE0
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0
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where (55) follows from a similar integration by parts argument as the one in equations (47)-(53).
The next Lemma uses Lemma 3 to prove (24).
Lemma 4 For all admissible processes Gt ∈ G:
max
Gt∈G

















γ ds + λW0
  
(56)
Proof of Lemma 4. Proposition 1 along with Lemma 3 implies that for any admissible process
32Gt there exists a λG > 0 and a decreasing process XG
t ∈ D that minimizes (17) such that
V (W0) = E












































Moreover, since the process Gt enforces ct ≥ ξ, equation (16) implies that λG ≤ ξ−γ. Next take





γis an optimal consumption process, it exhausts the




















γ = W0. This furthermore implies
that (57) can be rewritten as



















ds + λW0. (58)
Next deﬁne X∗





t . Using Nt, one
can rewrite equation (58) as















ds + λW0. (59)
Since λGXG
t is a decreasing process that starts at λG and always stays below ξ−γ, the Skorohod
equation31 implies that there exists another decreasing process λGX∗G
t that also starts at λG and











. Note that X∗G
t is identical to X∗
t with the
31For the Skorohod equation see Karatzas and Shreve (1991) p. 210.
















Using (61) and (59) leads to
V (W0) ≤ E
  ∞
0


























To study the maximization problem of equation (63) it is useful to compute the derivative of   As
with respect to Ns. Performing this computation and combining terms gives

















At this stage it is useful to consider two cases separately. The ﬁrst case is λ > λG. In this case, it
is straightforward to show that Qs = 1. Hence in maximizing   A(s), one can constrain attention to
values of Ns ≤ 1. An examination of (64) reveals that
∂   A(s)
∂Ns ≥ 0 for all Ns ≤ 1 and all X∗
s, since
X∗
s ≤ 1. Hence the solution to (63) is Ns = 1 when λ > λG.













Using this observation in (64) reveals that the optimal choice for Ns is always equal to 1.32
The above reasoning shows that the optimal solution of (63) is given by Ns = 1. Returning to
(62), this implies that
















32To see this distinguish cases. When X∗
s = 1, then solving
∂   A(s)
∂Ns = 0 gives Ns = 1 ≤ Qs. Hence Ns is the
unique interior solution. When X∗
s < 1, then
∂   A(s)
∂Ns > 0 for all Ns ≤ Qs = 1. Hence the solution is given by
the corner Ns = Qs = 1.
34Since this bound holds for arbitrary λ ∈ (0,ξ−γ] and arbitrary Gt ∈ G, it also holds for the
λ ∈ (0,ξ−γ] that minimizes the right hand side of the above equation and the Gt ∈ G that maximizes
the right hand side. Hence (56) follows.
The next part of the proof of Proposition 2 is to show that equation (29) holds. A ﬁrst step is
to show that (29) provides an upper bound to J (W0).
Lemma 5 The value function of problem 2 is bounded above by





















Proof of Lemma 5. The proof of this Lemma follows identical steps to the proof of the
previous Lemma. To see this, take an arbitrary triplet <   λ,Xt,ct > that satisﬁes equations (21)-
(23) of Problem 2. Then for any λ > 0, one obtains























Notice that this equation is identical to equation (58), with the exception that λG is replaced by   λ
and XG
t is replaced by Xt. Since the equations following (58) hold for any λG,XG
t they also hold
for   λ,Xt. Accordingly, by repeating the same steps, one can arrive at (65).
The next step in the proof of the proposition is to show that the inequality in (65) holds with
equality for the optimal policy. The following Lemma presents a step in this direction.
Lemma 6 Let F (λ) be given by
F(λ) = E






























Assume moreover that (27) is met. Then
min
λ∈(0,ξ−γ]
[F(λ) + λW0] = min
λ>0
[F(λ) + λW0] (68)
35and (65) can be rewritten as J (W0) ≤ minλ>0 [F(λ) + λW0]. Moreover, letting λ∗ be given as
λ∗ ≡ argminλ>0 [F(λ) + λW0] implies that E0











γ is a feasible consumption process for problem 2.
Proof of Lemma 6. To save notation, let
Zt ≡ λeρtHtX∗
t , (69)
and note that Z0 = λ, and that Zt ∈ (0,ξ−γ] by the deﬁnition of X∗
t in equation (28). Equation






















It will be convenient to compute the two terms inside equation (70) separately. Deﬁne ﬁrst
G(Zt) ≡ E









To compute G(Zt), it is easiest to let τε be the ﬁrst hitting time of Zt to the level ε > 0, namely
τε ≡ infs≥t {Zs = ε}, and then compute the expression:
Gε (Zt) = E









To compute (72), apply ﬁrst Ito’s Lemma to (69) to obtain dZt















γ = 0, (73)
subject to the boundary conditions Gε
Z (ξ−γ) = 0,Gε(ε) = 0.
Equation (73) is a linear ordinary diﬀerential equation with general solution
Gε (Z) = C1Zφ−
















ρ − r − κ2
2
 2
+ 2(ρ + q)κ2
κ2 < 0 (74)
36To satisfy the two boundary conditions Gε













γ = 0, C1εφ−
































It remains now to verify that Gε (Zt) satisﬁes (72). To this end, apply Ito’s Lemma to
e−(ρ+q)tGε(Zt) to obtain for any time T ∧ τε




























Using (73) inside the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of the above equation along with
Gε
Z (ξ−γ) = 0 inside the third term, letting T → ∞ along with Gε(ε) = 0, and using the monotone
convergence theorem gives
Gε(Zt) = Et














ZZ is bounded between t and τε, the second term in the above expression is a martingale






















→ 0 and ε
1− 1
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Equation (71) follows as a consequence of the monotone convergence theorem.
37It remains to compute the expression
N (Zt,X∗

































It is now possible to compute F(λ) which is given by

















































































Using the formula for F(λ), equation (65) can be expressed as minλ∈(0,ξ−γ] {F(λ) + λW0},which
leads to the ﬁrst order condition F′ (λ∗) = −W0. Using (82) leads to
W0 = E0














This last equation implies that λ∗,X∗







satisfy (21) and (23). To show that the choice  λ∗,X∗
t ,c∗
t  constitutes a feasible triplet, it remains
to show that it also satisﬁes (22). By construction of X∗
t this will be the case as long as λ∗ < ξ−γ.
This will indeed be the case as long as W0 satisﬁes (27). To see this, note that ξ−γ is the unique
38solution of F′ (λ∗) = −W0, when W0 is given by W0 =
1
γ +φ−1































The above equation shows that F
′
(λ) is an increasing function of λ for 0 < λ < ξ−γ and hence the
solution λ∗ of equation F′ (λ∗) = −W0 is a decreasing function of W0. Hence, as long as W0 satisﬁes
(27), then λ∗ < ξ−γ. Since the interior solution λ∗ is smaller than ξ−γ, equation (68) follows.
Combining the above Lemma with (65) implies that
J(W0) ≤ min
λ>0

































γ is a feasible consumption process for
problem for problem 2 and J (W0) is the value function of the problem. The above three lines
imply that equation (65) holds with equality as long as one chooses the optimal solution in the
statement of the proposition. This concludes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of this Proposition is just a special case of Section 6 in
He and Pages (1993) and hence I give only a sketch and refer the reader to He and Pages (1993)
for details. To start, deﬁne
  V (λ) = min
Xs∈D
E

















By equation (8) and equation (17) of Proposition 1
V (W0) = min
λ>0
 











r . Next, for an arbitrary decreasing process Xt let Zt be deﬁned as Zt ≡
39λeρsHsXs, and note that Z0 = λ. Applying Ito’s Lemma to Zt gives:
dZt
Zt




With this deﬁnition of Zt one can solve the maximization problem inside (84) and rewrite   V (λ) as
  V (Z0) = min
Xs∈D
E














From this point on, one can use similar arguments to He and Pages (1993), and treat (87) as
a singular stochastic control problem over the set of decreasing processes Xt. As He and Pages
(1993) show, the optimal solution is to always decrease Xt appropriately, so as to keep Zt in the
interval (0,Z]. Z is a free boundary that is determined next.
Using this conjecture for the optimal policy one can now proceed as He and Pages (1993) to
establish that   V (Z) satisﬁes the ordinary diﬀerential equation:
κ2
2





γ + y0Z = 0 for all Z ∈ (0,Z].
The general solution to this equation is










where K is given in (26), φ in (25) and φ− in (74) and C1,C2 are arbitrary constants. By arguments
similar to He and Pages (1993), one can set C2 = 0 (since φ− < 0). Hence it remains to determine C1
and the free boundary Z. As most singular stochastic control problems, one can employ a “smooth









= 0. Using the “smooth pasting” and “high contact” conditions, along with the general






















γ + φ − 1
  (90)
The next steps to verify that the conjectured policy is indeed optimal are identical to He and Pages
(1993) and are left out.
40To conclude the proof, note that sofar the calculations were true for an arbitrary y0. To deter-
mine the y0 that will safeguard that ct ≥ ξ observe that ct = Z
− 1
γ by equation (16). Since the
optimal policy is to control Xt so as to “keep” Zt in the interval (0,Z] it follows that the minimum
level of consumption is given by Z
− 1
γ. Hence, in order to guarantee condition ct ≥ ξ it suﬃces to











γ + φ − 1
 
.
Solving for y0 gives
y0 = ξ(r + q)K
1
γ + φ − 1
φ − 1
.
One can now substitute that level of y0 into (90), (89) and use the resulting expressions to obtain
from (88) the following expression for   V (Z) :
















Evaluating this expression at Z0 = λ and using equation (85) gives equation (30), which shows that
the “constant income” policy of the current proposition attains the upper bound of Proposition 2.












dγ < 0. Diﬀerentiating
y0















2 + γ (r + q) + ρ − r
 2,
where
B ≡ (φ − 1)(ρ − r) − (r + q) + (φ − 1)
κ2
2

















dγ < 0, as long as (φ − 1)(ρ − r) −(r + q)+
(φ − 1) κ2
2 < 0. Since φ solves the quadratic equation κ2
2 φ2+
 
ρ − r − κ2
2
 
φ −(ρ+q) = 0, it follows
41that (φ − 1)(ρ − r) −(r + q)+ (φ − 1) κ2
2 = −(φ − 1)
2 κ2
2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of this proposition proceeds in steps. The ﬁrst two
Lemmas establish that the proposed transfer policy will make it possible for an agent who follows
the optimal consumption process of proposition 4 to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint.
The proof then continues to show that the wealth process associated with the optimal consumption
process of proposition 4, along with the portfolio process (34), will lead to non-negative levels of
wealth at all times. Finally, it is shown that the consumption policy of proposition 4, along with
the portfolio choice (34), are optimal for an agent who is faced with transfers given by (32) and
attain the upper bound of proposition 2.



















t = 0. (91)
Proof of Lemma 7. It will simplify notation to let
η ≡ −Kξ
 




















Applying integration by parts and using the deﬁnition of Zt gives
Et

































By using a logic similar to equations (73)-(75),
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which follows easily from the deﬁnition of η.
















s − 1)dGs (100)
Proof of Lemma 8. Taking any λ ∈ ( 0,ξ−γ], using the deﬁnition of X∗
t , and equation (91),
the same reasoning behind (46) leads to
E












































Hence the λ∗ that minimizes (30) (and hence minimizes [102]) also minimizes (101). But since
λ minimizes (101), the same argument as in He and Pages (1993) (Proof of Theorem 1) leads to
(100).
Lemma 8 has asserted that the consumption policy (99) satisﬁes the intertemporal budget
constraint (100). It remains to show that this consumption policy along with the portfolio policy
(34) will lead to a process for ﬁnancial wealth that satisﬁes Wt ≥ 0. To that end let η be given as
in (92) and deﬁne:


















ρ − r + κ2 
ZW∗
Z − (r + q)W + (Z)
− 1
γ = 0 (104)
W∗  
ξ−γ 















The next step is to verify that W∗ (Zt) is the stochastic process for the ﬁnancial wealth of the
agent. To see this, use the deﬁnition of c∗
s (equation [99]) along with the deﬁnitions of dGt,W∗
t
(equations [32] and [103] respectively) and apply Ito’s Lemma to obtain:
d










































+ (r + q)W∗
t dt − κ2ZtW∗
Zdt − κW∗
ZZtdBt =
= (r + q)W∗











44= (r + q)W∗































































Hence the process W∗
t satisﬁes the equation (10) for an agent who chooses a consumption policy
given by (99) and a portfolio policy given by (34). Accordingly, it is the ﬁnancial wealth process
that is associated with that policy pair. Moreover, by equation (105) the ﬁnancial wealth process
is non-negative. Accordingly, the policies given by (99) and (34) are feasible for an agent who is
faced with the transfer process (32).
Verifying the optimality of the stated policy pair is simple. According to proposition 1











































One can use now Lemma 8 to illustrate that the consumption policy (99) leads to a payoﬀ for
the agent equal to Q(W0) which is an upper bound to the value function of the agent V (W0). Since
the consumption policy (99) is also feasible, the payoﬀ associated with that policy also provides a
lower bound to the value function V (W0). Hence this policy must be optimal. Finally, the easiest
way to show that
D0 = Kξ
1







is to observe that the intertemporal budget constraint implies that
Eτ0















45where τ0 is the ﬁrst time that Xτ0 ≥ 1 (or equivalently the ﬁrst time that Wτ0 = 0 and λ∗eρτ0Hτ0 =
ξ−γ) . A few manipulations can be used to show that
Eτ0











γ + φ − 1
φ − 1






































γ + φ − 1
φ − 1








is identical to the one given in Oksendal (1998), Chapter
10.
Proof of Proposition 5. Take any transfer process Gt such that the resulting consumption
process of the agent satisﬁes ct ≥ ξ. Proposition 1 implies then that there exists a cumulative
multiplier process XG













, and P ≡ E






























s . Equation (80) implies that
E






















Combining (82) and (83) implies that the right hand side of the above equation is decreasing in λG
whenever λG ≤ ξ−γ. Since c0 =
 
λG − 1
γ ≥ ξ this implies furthermore
E































Combining (107) and (108) concludes the proof.
33This is an implication of the Skorohod equation. See Karatzas and Shreve (1991).
46Proof of Proposition 6. First note that a marginal increase in the minimum savings rate χ











































where J (W0+ + χω) is given in proposition 2 and   Xs is a decreasing process starting at   X(−τ) =




U(   Xs,λ;χ).
















Whenever λ   X0
H0
H(−τ) ≥ ξ−γ, so that the constraint W0+ ≥ 0 does not bind, one can use the ﬁrst
order condition from the second maximization problem inside the square brackets of (109) to obtain
J′(W0+ + χω) = λ   X0eρτ H0
H(−τ)
.




























= λδe−qτω − λδE(−τ)


























































e−(r+q)(s+τ)ds = ωe−qτ, (112)
where the inequality follows from the fact that ersHs is a martingale while   Xs is a decreasing
process, so that   Xs ≥   X0 for all s ∈ [−τ,0]. Combining (111) and (112) leads to Uχ ≤ 0.
Hence, letting χmin denote the minimum savings rate that will satisfy (27) as given by (41), it




. This furthermore implies that
F(χmin) = U(   Xχmin
s ,λχmin
;χmin) ≥ U(   Xχmin
s ,λχmin
;χ) ≥ U(   Xχ
s ,λχ;χ) = F(χ),
where   X
χ
s ,λχ denote the minimizers of U given χ and similar for   X
χmin
s ,λχmin
. Hence it is never
optimal to set the minimum savings rate above χmin.
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